INTRODUCTION

The prominence given to ecosystem management at the Intermediate Ministerial Meeting of the North Sea Conference in Bergen earlier this year, presages an important, but quite daunting, challenge to existing institutional arrangements for fisheries management. At present, the concept of ecosystem management is presented only in 'soft-focus', lacking universality of definition and not yet developed in operational form. One description which usefully summarizes the essential characteristics of ecosystem management portrays it as: "an extension of management philosophy that focuses on local and large geographic scales, considers long term temporal scales and preserves biotic and abiotic components of ecosystems when making natural resource management decisions" (Schramm & Hubert, 1996).

Other definitions tend not to recognize the full extent of the paradigm shift and continue to reassert the conventional scientific and economic values of contemporary fisheries management. For the North Sea, however, the definition tends to be more ecocentric, laying greater stress on the precautionary principle and emphasizing the need to consider all significant factors that affect all species within an ecosystem (Assessment Report, 1997). However ecosystem management may be defined, what does seem certain is that the ascendancy of the ecosystem approach should eventually lead to the abandonment of separate sectoral policies for the marine environment and its resources. As a result, fisheries management would lose its status as an autonomous policy area guided by its own independent aims and objectives.

Instead, it would become embedded in a broader, more long term strategy for the management of the marine ecosystem as a whole. It is unlikely, therefore, that existing organizational structures for policy formulation and implementation will be able to cope adequately with this new agenda.

The aim of this short paper is to explore one aspect of institutional reform by re-examining the concept of co-management, in the light of the new imperatives for safeguarding the marine ecosystem.

CO-MANAGEMENT IN FISHERIES

One of the most important debates on fisheries management in recent years has focused on the nature and extent of joint responsibility between the state and organizations representing the user groups: the issue of co-management. To date, the outcomes have been disappointing. Academically, they have proved inconclusive, partly because of inconsistency in definition. The concept has been criticized for harking back to a pre-modern era where localized community action was appropriate and sufficient; the complexity of modern fishing systems is deemed to make co-management both irrelevant and unattainable. More importantly, there has been a reluctance on the part of governments and user groups to forge closer working relationships: fisheries politics have remained adversarial rather than consensual, though there are some important exceptions to this rule.

Co-management is concerned primarily with defining the communicative and collaborative processes by which management strategies and regulatory measures are formulated. Initially, the key questions for co-management

are: who participates? How are the decision making processes managed? How are conflicts of interest mediated and consensual decisions brokered? (Jentoft et al, 1997). Answers to these questions should help to build a well-defined and carefully structured relationship between the state and the representative organizations, and to elaborate protocols for clear divisions of responsibility in the sphere of management. Ideally, co-management should combine two distinct but complementary features: (i) prior consultation over the aims, objectives and instruments of policy and (ii) the devolving of specific management responsibilities to appropriate fishermen's organizations. The combination of the two is essential. Consultation without responsibility could tempt some fishermen's organizations to press unrealistic demands on the administration, largely for political reasons. Delegation of responsibility without prior consultation may be dismissed as little more than a shuffling off of administrative chores. Devolved management alone will not resolve problems of commitment and compliance among resource users.

Although both consultation and devolved management are widely recognized as contributing equally to the legitimation of management policy, it is still rare in Europe to find systems which incorporate both features. In Denmark, for example, there is a strong tradition of negotiation between state and industry over the formulation of sectoral policy. In fisheries, this is conducted through the Regulation Advisory Board comprising representatives from the harvesting, processing and scientific interest groups. But, there has been little movement towards devolving responsibility for policy implementation to the user groups. By contrast, in the UK, Producers' Organizations have assumed responsibility for day to day management of quotas; but there are no formal channels of communication and negotiation between the industry and the administration.

Consultation takes place on an ad hoc basis and, typically, occurs relatively late in the policy process.

Where the industry is characterized by diversity and is segmented into different geographical and functional constituencies, there may be considerable difficulties in creating a representative consultative body. Problems may arise over the breadth of representation and the balance of numbers which will allow equity of representation and efficiency in decision making without risking the emergence of counterproductive internal cleavages. There is, ` a tendency for governments to use such problems as an excuse for not developing a framework for consultation. Governments may also shy away from devolving responsibilities to user groups on the supposed grounds that fishermen's organizations lack competence in undertaking strategic tasks and doubts about their willingness to enforce regulations with sufficient vigor. Fisheries management in The Netherlands seems largely to have escaped these problems. The Fish Board, comprising producers, merchants, processors and the retail trade, acts as the principal negotiating body in discussions with central government. Moreover, since 1993 the government has ceded wide powers of quota management to the eight management groups, comprising 97% of the offshore fleet.

CO-MANAGEMENT IN A MULTI DIMENSIONAL STRUCTURE

Built on mutual respect and trust and guided by a shared determination to reach a workable consensus, co-management should, in theory, succeed where both parties - the state and the user groups - work towards a broadly similar set of objectives. A common agenda is the basis of successful co-management. What then, of a situation wherein co-responsibility is shared among several partners - the state, the fishing industry and the conservation interests?

The addition of several new stakeholders, including both environmental organizations and government departments, makes the task of finding a consensus more difficult.

The inclusion of more than one government department, each with its own priorities and modes of negotiation with its client groups, adds to the complexity of the process. Plurality and diversity of views can work towards 'creative tension'; but, equally, there is the danger of communicative dissonance resulting from a failure to understand each other's science base and to respect the different policy objectives. The worst outcome is where the policy process becomes distorted by interdepartmental rivalries in the quest to become primus inter pares.

Further problems may arise from the inability of interest groups to negotiate directly with each other, whether from inexperience or, more worryingly, from entrenched positions of antipathy or hostility. At the Co-management Seminar in Groningen earlier this year (see Recommendation & Conclusions in this issue), I formed an impression - rightly or wrongly - that in the case of the Wadden Sea, the different interest groups chose not to enter into dialogue with each other over disputed areas of common interest, but to hide behind the skirts of the relevant government department and leave it to interdepartmental negotiations to find a solution. That is not what is meant by co-manage ment.

It would, however, be wrong to caricature ecosystem management as a confrontation between fishing and conservation interests. Fishermen are clearly not averse to the idea of a rich, abundant and diverse ecosystem. Most would acknowledge that a healthy ecosystem is a necessary precondition for sustainable fisheries. Inshore fishermen especially recognize the need to work in harmony with nature. Where antagonism may occur is as a result of careless talk about the application of the precautionary principle and unqualified assertions of the need for draconian measures to restore productivity and diversity to the ecosystem.

The ecosystem approach involves a major re orientation in the science base for management away from the narrow and insecure perspectives of short run, bio-economic assessments of commercial fish stocks and 'safe levels' of exploitation to a more holistic, integrated evaluation of the status of the ecosystem in terms of its productivity, diversity and integrity. Although emphasis is rightly placed on the 'indivisibility' and interdependence of large marine ecosystems, which require a multinational approach to management in areas like the North and Baltic Seas, in practice it is much more likely that the ecosystem approach will be implemented at the local level in areas like the Wadden Sea. But local management systems must be sufficiently 'open' to accommodate the effects of non-local 'events' which can profoundly impact on the local situation.

Practical considerations, as well as political expediency, suggest that we are unlikely to witness a replacement of the existing conventions of fisheries management by entirely new institutions and policies. What is more likely, certainly in the short term, is a recognition of the need to broaden the constituency base for fisheries management - to create, in a very real sense, the basis for co-management. This will require, inter alia, a willingness to heed the counsels of those with a broader understanding of the marine ecosystem, to adopt a more cautious approach to resource exploitation and to recognize the need for sharing the harvestable resources of the seas between man and nature.

Just how cross-party negotiations should be structured is a matter for national and local deliberation. The chosen system must sit easily within the broader political culture. Thus for the Wadden Sea, the co-management systems may well vary between the three coastal states, without detriment to the overall objectives of the management strategy. Again, there is the question of whether new structures should be brought into being, designed specifically to suit the needs of ecosystem management;

clearly, where no previous organizations are in place, this is the only option. Alternatively, it may be feasible to adapt existing organizations to accommodate the demands of an ecosystem approach.

In England and Wales, the well established Sea Fisheries Committees (SFCs), responsible for regulating fisheries within the six mile limits, have been modified in order to meet the growing pressures for a greener approach to fisheries management (Symes & Phillipson, 1997). The Environment Act, 1995 effectively redefined the structure and role of SFCs so that they might undertake new responsibilities for marine environmental management. Their bylaw powers were extended to allow the imposition of controls for environmental reasons and their membership rules were revised to include environmental representation. In the longer term, it is unlikely that the inclusion of a token environmental expert will prove sufficient. SFCs have also been nominated as one among several relevant and competent public bodies capable of undertaking management roles in respect of marine Special Areas of Conservation under the EC's Habitat's Directive 1992. Whether or not they will eventually be granted the responsibility remains to be seen. But should they fail the test, new organizations with a more balanced representation of interests will surely be demanded by the environmental lobby.

CONCLUSIONS

The ecosystem approach is not simply about conducting fisheries management within more tightly circumscribed policy objectives, though this may be how things will develop in the short term. Nor, is it solely concerned with integrating fisheries management and nature conservation. It implies a more radical paradigm shift from sectoral or single interest management to a more comprehensive systems management. Eventually, ecosystem management must aspire to a broader agenda and the incorporation of a wider range of interest groups. But for the present, the question that exercises politicians, fishermen and conservationists alike, is whether ecosystem management demands a totalitarian approach. Is coercive management more likely to succeed where consensus management is doomed a failure? Can healthy ecosystems be sustained on a basis of compromise? Can the fishing industry survive without it?

In the long run, the ecosystem approach could well prove more successful in a co-management framework, but there is likely to be a lengthy period oêment ahead as fishing and conservation interests learn to cohabit. It is incumbent on the state to set clear objectives for integrated management and to demand of the different interest groups a constructive dialogue leading to the elaboration of detailed management plans at the local level. The evidence from the Wadden Sea is that the first part of this process is already well in hand.

REFERENCES

Assessment Report on Fisheries and Fisheries Related Species and Habitats, 1997. Ministry of Environment, Oslo.

Jentoft, S., McCay, B.J. and D.C. Wilson 1997. Social theory and fisheries co-management, paper presented at the European Social Science Fisheries Network workshop on Alternative Management System, Brest, August 14-16.

Schramm, H.L. & W.A. Hubert 1996. Ecosystem management: implications for fisheries management, Fisheries, 21(12), 6-11.

Symes, D. & J. Phillipson 1997. Inshore fisheries management in the UK: Sea Fisheries Committees and the challenge of marine environmental management, Marine Policy, 21(3), 207-224.

Authors address:

David Symes
Department of Geography
The University of Hull
UK - Hull, HU6 7RX

E-mail: J.Phillipson@geo.hull.ac.uk